Erickson v. Gospel Foundation of California [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
10-29-1954
Erickson v. Gospel Foundation of California
[DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Civil Law Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation




McK. Dig. References: Asso-
582 ERicKsoN v. GosPEL FouNDA'l'ION oF CALIF. C.2d 
[3] Associations-Intervention of Courts-In Case of Expulsion.-
Courts different ru]ps of law to review of 
ll1 
particular group 
extent of member's interest. 
depending 
and character and 
[ 4] Religious and Charitable Societies-Internal Affairs-Juris-
diction of Civil Courts.-Courts are reluctant to interfere with 
organizations with respect to their 
internal and expulsion of member proper tribunal 
of such an association will not be reviewed where no property 
is involved. 
[5] !d.-Internal Affairs-Members-Expulsion.-A or-
need not adhere to strict requirements imposed in 
proceedings, and form of procedure used in cancellation 
of membership is immaterial if there has been substantial 
compliance with rules of group and accused member has been 
afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself. 
[6] !d.-Internal Affairs-Members-Expulsion.-Evidence is suf-
ficient to permit inference that cancellation of plaintiff's 
membership in religious organization was made in good faith 
where provision was made in rules of organization for elimi-· 
nation of discord by permitting member causing dissension 
to be removed by majority vote, where plaintiff made number 
of suggestions which were disturbing to another member and 
dh·ector of organization and his retention as a member would 
tend to disrupt its harmonious operation, where he urged 
removal of general manager of organization and employment 
of himself as manager, and where he proposed to make Cali-
fornia his headquarters for solicitation of funds for missionary 
work and to "channel" money collected through the organiza-
tion, though solicitation of money for such purpose was 
contrary to plan of founders of organization. 
[7] !d.-Internal Affairs-Members-Expulsion.-Written request 
of a founder of religious organization that plaintiff be 
elected a director, presented after such founder's death, 
does not prevent termination of plaintiff's membership in 
organization where, assuming that such request had any bind-
ing effect, it cannot be reasonably construed as exempting 
plaintiff from provision of by-laws authorizing cancellation 
of membership. 
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Associations and Clubs, § 16; Am.Jur., Asso-
ciations and Clubs, § 17 et seq. 
[ 4] Suspension or expulsion from church or religious society 
and remedies therefor, note, 20 A.L.R.2d 421. See also Cal.Jur., 
Religious and Charitable Societies, § 13; Am.Jur., Religious So-
cieties, § 59 et seq. 
Oct. ERICKSON v. GosPEL PouNDAnox OF CAr,w. 






,John \V l'rec;ton and Choate for 
Court of I-'os 
Affirmed. 
for defendant 
Gibson, Dmw & Crutcher, Sherman vVelpton, Jr., and 
Leslie G. Tnnwr for Hesponclents. 
GIBSON, C. ,J.--The membership of plaintiff in defendant 
Uospel lhnmd.ation of California was cancelled by vote of 
the members, and he brought this aetion for deelaratory 
relief to determine the validity of the caueellation. Plaintiff 
joiued as defendants Mary Liddeeoat and Norman E. John-
son, who al'e both member:;; and direetors of the Foundation, 
Selma C. Abnot, who was elected a member and director in 
plaintiff's place, and \Valter E. \Vebb, the general manager. 
He lms appealed from a judgment declaring that his member-
ship was Yalidly caneellrd and annulled. 
The Poundation is a nonprofit eorporation formed in 1946 
under the laws of California. Its purpose is to foster, promote 
and operate religious, charitable, evangelistic and mission 
entPrprises, ami Hl('Jll bers are required to subscribe to a doe-
trinal statement which eonsists of tenets of a solely religious 
nature. 
The authorized number of members of the F'oundation is 
the same as the number of directors, which is fixed at three, 
and the personnel of the membership and directorship is 
identical. No member is to obtain any pecuniary gain or 
profit, awl in the event of dissolution the property of the 
Poundatiou is not to go to tlw members but to certain named 
organizations. 
The by-laws provide that every member is entitled to one 
vote and, ill <tddition, shall have one vote for each $1,000 
in mmtey or property conveyed to and aceepted by the 
F'oundation and that all contributions shall be subject to 
approvaL and aeecptance by a majority of the votes of the 
members. It is further provided that a membership may 
be cancf'llr•d and annuHed by a majority vote. 
The original members and direetors wrre A. lVL Johnson, 
Mary Liddeeoat and Norman Johnson. In December, 1947, 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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Ill 
annulment of his 
votes in favor of 
such action. 
Plaintiff 
an additional vote to a member for each contribution of 
$1,000 the l<'oundation. His attack is based 
upon the claim that there is one class of members in 
the Foundation and that the statutes equal voting 
rights for all members of one class in a nonprofit corporation. 
At the time the l<'oundation was incorporated and this by-law 
was adopted the applicable statutes provided as follows: 'The 
authorized number and of its members, the 
if any, the voting, 
of each class of membership, 
and may be set forth either in the 
§ subd. 5, now 
The ''may 
contain, among other for: . (9) The 
qualifications of members and different classes of member-
ships, and the and other interests 
or of each dass." ( Civ. § 
m § 9402, snbd. b.) ''A nonprofit corporation 
shall have such classes thereof as may be 
in the articles or but unless otherwise 
provided there shall be but one class of members whose 
rights and interests shall be § 600, 1st 
par., reenacted as 'Unless otherwise 
in the articles or every member of a non-
shall be entitled to one vote and may vote 
. . . No member may cumulate his votes 
in the articles or 
now embodied in 
[1] 
provide for 
ferent classes. 'l'he 
authorization because 
of membership, with for each 
585 
based upon the amount of contributions made individual 
nwmbers and the Poundation. It 
<''·lually among the members of each and we find uv""""""' 
arbitrary or unreasonable in its application. [2] 
claimed plaintiff, does the violate section 9500* 
the Corporations Code, which relates to the powers to be 
exercised by directors. The affects only the rights 
of the members as such and does not regulate their powers 
as directors. The three directors have equal voting powers 
when acting in that capacity. 
Plaintiff next attacks the cancellation of his membership 
by asserting that no charges were filed against him, that he 
was given no opportunity to be heard in his defense and 
that under such circumstances the action taken was arbitrary 
and capricious. [3] The courts have different 
rules of law relating to review of the action of an organiza-
tion in expelling a member, depending on the nature of the 
particular group involved and the character and extent of 
the member's interest. For example, it has been held that 
one may not be expelled from an organization such as a labor 
union or a mutual benefit society, where property rights are 
attached to membership, without notice and a reasonable 
opportunity to defend against the charges made. (Cason v. 
Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 37 Cal.2d 134, 142 et seq. [231 
P.2d 6]; 1'aboada v. Sociedad Espanola de Beneficencia Mu-
tua, 191 CaL 187, 191 et seq. [215 P. 27 A.L.R. 1508] .) 
[ 4] The courts have always been reluctant to interfere with 
actions taken by religious organizations with respect to their 
internal affairs, and it has been commonly held that the 
expulsion of a member by a proper tribunal of such an asso-
ciation will not be reviewed where no property right is 
involved. (See Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. (U.S.) 131, 
139-140 [21 L.Ed. 69] ; First English L. Church v. Evangelical 
L. Synod, 135 F.2d 701, 703; Mount Olive Primitive Baptist 
*Section 9500 of the Corporations Code provides: ''Except as other-
wise provided by the articles of incorporation or the by-laws, the powers 
of a nonprofit corporation shall be exercised, its property controlled, 
and its affairs conducted by a board of not less than three directors.'' 
C.2d 
('llurch v. Patrick, 2;)2 Ala. 672 f:)o.2(1 lil7, 618-GID I; 
Ballew v. Deal, 20D Uu. GO~l [70 S . .BJ.2d 7G7. 7G8-7GD]; Kauf}'-
man v. Plank, 214 lll.App. >lOG, :no; King v. 8111 JOG Kall. 
624 [J89 P 147, 148]; Jenkins v. New Shiloh Bapt·ist 
Church, J89 .i\ld. 512 [[56 A.2cl 79J- ; Murr v. Jl.!a:x;-
IDcll, (Jio.J\piJ.) 2J2 S.W.2d 232-2!37; Lced8 Y. liar 
D ~'LJ. 202 A.2c1 71:l, 718-7JDI; 20 AL.R2d 
4:)1 et seq.) 
The Ponll(laiion is a rl'ligions and 
cou<:cde(lly has JHJ property rigb ts in it. His relationship 
to it, however, differ" in some respeets from that of an onlimu·y 
ehur<:h member. As we hav(' seen, the membership of the 
:B'oumlation is limite<l to three, and plaintiff was ill a posi-
tion to <·xert mueh greater iniiuene<~ on the management of 
the ail' airs of the group !han eould be exercisPd by a member 
of a eongregation 1vhieh is unlimited in size. Moreover, the 
perw11nd of the membership awl directorship of the Fuumla-
tion is identical, alld plaintiff ceased to be a director IYhen 
he was expelled as a member. A few eourts have held that 
the action of a religious body in expelling an officer, snch 
as a trustee, may be~ reviP\Yed to the extent of determining 
whether there bas been notiee and hearing, whether the 
procedural rules of the organization have been follo·wed, and 
whether the action \Yas taken in good faith. (See Dittemore 
"·Dickey, 249 Mass. 95 [144 XE. 57]; In re Koch, 257 N.Y. 
:318 [J78 K.E. ;)4;"5, 546].) This it> apparently the minority 
view, and we uecd not determine whether it should be follovYed 
in this state, becanse, if we assume it to be the eorrect rule, 
the record in this ease shows eompliauce with the requirements. 
It appears that on .April 26, Hl50, Miss I,iclclecoat gave 
plaintiff a notiee of eaneellation of his membership and a 
letter of explanation referring to eonduet on hif'; part \rhieh 
had disturbed her. She harl a lengthy conversation with 
him, and it ma;' be inferred that they diseussed the matters 
whid1 eauscd her concern and that he fully understood th,, 
objections to his eoncluet. At Jhat time plaintiff told Miss 
IJidde(~oat. that he had reeeiYed 110 notiee of a meeting ealletl 
to eousiclcr termination of his membership. Thereafter the 
seeretary gave plaintiff written notiee that a speeial meeting 
of members wonld be held in California on Augnst 21, ] 950. 
to eonsi(l.er the eaneellation of his membership. Plaintiff 
attended the meeting, after being assured that he 1vould be 
pai(l his expenses in traveling from his home in Chieago. The 
miuutes show that .M:iss Liddeeoat read a prepared statement 
Oet. J EmcKROK v. GasPEr~ J•lOUKDATIOK OP CAr~rF. 
[43 C.2d 581; 275 P.2d 474] 
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which recited ·what had been done in April with respect to 
plaintiff's expulsion, and it may be inferred that the state-
ment, whieh is not in the record, referred to the grounds 
for his expulsion. 1\Iiss J_.~iddecoat, as president, called for 
a \'Ote upon the cancellation of plaintiff's membership, and 
he was expellrd by a majority of thr votes rast. Plaintifi 
did not Yote, and, although the minutes state that he was 
not allowPd to Yote, l\1iss TJiddccoat testified that th('re was 
no effort to restrain him from speaking or registering his dis-
approval. During the mreting be remained silent and made 
uo attempt to oppose the action. 
[5] An organization such as the Foundation need not 
adher(' to th0 strict requirements imposed in legal proceed-
ings. and the form of procedure used is immaterial if there 
has bf'en substantial compliance with the rules of the group 
and thr aec11Sed membrr has been afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to drfend himself. (See Cason v. Glass Bottle 
Blowers Assn .. 37 Cal.2d 134, 143 [231 P.2d 6] .) The rules 
of the Foundation wrre followed with respect to the August 
meeting at whicl1 plaintiff's membership was cancelled, and 
tlw evidence shows that the grounds urged for his expulsion 
Wf'I'P fully Pxplained to him prior to the meeting and that 
he had ample opportunity to be heard. 
[6] 'l'hr evidf'nce is elf'arly sufficient to permit an infer-
eueP that the Paneellation of plaintiff's membership was 
made in good faith. It is apparent that the founders of the 
organization \Yere of the opinion that harmony among the 
membrrs was essential to the accomplishmf'nt of the purposes 
of the F'oundation, and provision was made for the elimina-
1 io11 of discord by permitting a member causing dissension 
to be rrmoved by majority vote. Plaintiff made a number 
of suggest ions whiel1 Wf're disturbing to Miss Liddecoat, and 
it appears that his retf'ntion as a member would tend to dis-
rupt the harmonious operation of the Foundation. There 
was eyirlence that his actions in and out of the meetings 
Wf're inconsistent, and certain of his proposals appear to 
justify 'Miss IJiddeeoat 's conclusion that there was "a lot of 
self-interest" in the suggestions which he made concerning 
the operation of the association. During meetings he made 
faYorable comments on the way in which Mr. Webb, who was 
acting as general manager, conducted the affairs of the 
l<"mm<1ation, but outside the meetings he urged the removal 
of \VPbb alld the employment of himself as manager. He 
sought to purchase part of a ranch owned by the Foundation 
588 ERICKSON v. GosPEL FouNDATION OF CALIF. [43 C.2d 
and to a which had been made by 
the Foundation to secure operating funds. Plaintiff held 
services in Chicago and had a radio program in 
Des 1\foinrs through which he solicited funds to carry on 
work in South America. He proposed to make 
Califomia the for the solicitation of funds and 
to ''channel' the money collected the Foundation. 
Plaintiff that Foundation be used for 
to the the solicita-
tion of money was to the plan of the founders. His 
of course, be deemed inappropriate to one in 
his and well have tended to create disharmony 
and to interfere with the peaceful operation of the Founda-
tion. The trial court could reasonably conclude that the 
cancellation of plaintiff's membership was made in good faith 
with the honest belief that it would be in the best interests 
of the Foundation. 
[7] We come finally to plaintiff's contention that a written 
request by A. M. J obnson that plaintiff be elected a director 
and that he have active management in case of the death of 
Miss Liddecoat was binding on the Foundation and prevented 
the termination of plaintiff's membership. This request was 
in a paper which remained in A.M. Johnson's files until after 
his death and was then presented at the special meeting at 
which plaintiff was elected a director. Even if we should 
assume that the request had any binding effect, it cannot 
be reasonably construed as exempting plaintiff from the 
provision of the by-laws authorizing cancellation of mem-
bership. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, .J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I agree with the holding that the giving of unequal voting 
rights in a nonprofit corporation is authorized by the Cali-
fornia corporation law statutes and cannot, therefore, be 
declared to be against public policy, and also that A. M. 
Johnson's declaration of intention does not affect the present 
controversy. But I think this court should hold that a 
member of such a corporation may not be removed as such 
without cause or hearing. The by-laws here involved, while 
seemingly authorizing such, should be interpreted to mean 
that cause and hearing are required. 
Oct. ERICKSON v. GosPEL JilouNDATION OF CALIF. 589 




[43 C.2d 581; 275 P.2d 
associations as summarized this court in Cason v. Glass 
Bottle Blmoers 37 Cal.2d 143 P.2d 6] : "In 
cases of this the 
of individual members and to avoid 
the union to govern itself. The courts will 
the decision of an association one of its members 
if the rules of the association expulsion have not 
been observed or if the accused member has not been afforded 
those rudimentary rights which will give him a reasonable 
opportunity to defend against the made .... It is a 
fundamental principle that no man may be con-
dernned or prejttdiced in his rights without an opportunity 
to make his defense, and this principle is applicable not only 
to courts but also to labor unions and s·imilar organizations . 
. . . It is, of course, true that the refined and technical prac-
tices which have developed in the courts cannot be imposed 
upon the deliberations of workingmen, and the form of pro-
cedure is ordinarily immaterial if the accused is accorded a 
fair trial. ... The union's procedure, however, must be such 
as will afford the accused member substantial justice, and 
the requirements of a fair tr"ial will be imposed even though 
the rules of the ·union fail to provide therefor . ... The 
authorities recognize that such a trial includes the right to 
notice of the charges, to confront and cross-examine the 
accusers, and to examine and refute the evidence." (Em-
phasis added; see also Taboada v. Sociedad Egpanola de 
Beneficencia Mutua, 191 Cal. 187 [215 P. 673, 27 A.L.R. 
1508] ; Otto v. Tailors' P. &; B. Union, 75 Cal. 
308 [17 P. 217,7 Am.St.Rep. 156]; VonArx v. San Francisco 
G. Vercin, 113 Cal. 377 [45 P. 685]; McConville v. Milk 
Wagon Drivers' Union, 106 Cal.App. 696 [289 P. 852]; 
Ellis v. American Fed. of Labor, 48 Cal.App.2d 440 [120 
P.2d 79] ; Knights of The Ku Klux Klan v. Franc1:s, 79 Cal. 
App. 383 [249 P. 539]; Grand Grove etc. of Druids v. Gari-
baldi Grove etc. of Dntids, 105 Cal. 219 [38 P. 947] ; Supreme 
Lodge of The World v. Los Angeles Lodge No. 386, 177 Cal. 
132 [169 P. 1040]; Grand Grove etc. of Druids v. Garibaldi 
Grove, 130 Cal. 116 [62 P. 486, 80 Am.St.Rep. 80]; De Mille 
v. Arner·ican Fed. of Radio Artists, 31 Cal.2d 139, 155 [187 
P.2d 769, 175 A.L.R. 382]; Lawson v. Hewell, 118 Cal. 613 
590 ERICKSON v. GosPEL :B'ouNDATION m' CALIF. C.2d 
[50 P. 768, 49 hR.A. 400]; Smith v. Il.ern County 111edical 
Assn., 19 Cal.2d 268 [120 P.2d 874]; Haynes v. Annandale 
Oolf Cl1tb, 4 Cal.2d 28 [47 P.2d 470, 99 A.L.B. 1439], incor-
porated association; 21 A.L.R.2d 1897; 20 A.L.R2d 844, 
536; 37 Yale hJ. 368; 43 Harv.hReY. 993; 58 Yale L.J. 999.) 
Moreover, it has been said: "The proceedings of the society, 
in order to be regular and legal, in therefore, 
provide for notice to the accused and afford him an oppor-
tunity to be heard. . . 
''Indeed, it has been held that even though the by-laws 
expressly provide for the expuls·ion of a member withotd a 
trial such a provision is void and an expulsion in pttrsuance 
of such a by-law is not binding . ... 
"It has been held that in the absence of by-laws covering 
the subject that a member is entitled to a fair trial after due 
notice and that the procedure in such cases is to be analogous 
to ordinary judicial proceedings so far as necessary to render 
substantial justice." (Emphasis added; Taboada v. Sociedad 
Espanola de Beneficencia Mutna, supra, 191 Cal. 187, 191.) 
'rhe majority seems to intimate that there are no civil or 
property rights here involved and the Foundation is a re-
ligious organization and the courts will not interfere with 
its ecclesiastical affairs. 
There can be no question that here property and civil 
rights are involved. "While the members have no interest 
in the corporate assets, they as directors may receive a fee 
and expenses for attending meetings and their prestige and 
community standing may be adversely affected by a can-
cellation of their membership. Plaintiff was engaged in-
dependently in missionary and religious activities similar to 
those of the Foundation. By his arbitrary expulsion his 
;,tanding and ability to carry on those activities will be 
affected. 'I'hese may be "personal rights" but they are 
important. "When we turn aside from the authorities and 
consider the actual human interests which suffer from an 
expulsion, it becomes apparent that in many cases they are 
chiefly interests of personality. The expelled club member 
finds his social reputation blasted, and is likely to be black-
balled by other desirable clubs. The former trade unionist 
is ostracized by union members. A student like Shelley who 
has b2en excluded from college is branded for years to come, 
and deprived of intimate associations with places and com-
panions. Excommunication from a church means loss of the 
opportunity to worship God in familiar surroundings with 
Oet. EmoKsox v. GosPEL F'oeNDATION OF CAI,IF. 
[43 C.2d 581; 275 P.2d 474] 
;)9] 
a cherished ritual, and inflicts upon the devout believer lone-
liness of spirit and perhaps the dread of eternal damnation. 
In comparison \Yith such emotional deprivations, mere losses 
of property often appear triviaL It would seem natural that 
courts of eq nity should consider the desirability of remedying 
sueh injuries to personality, but they are hindered from 
so the oft-repeated doctrine that equity protects 
only property rights. Dean Pound and others have shown 
the uns11 bstantial basis of this doctrine in the older cases, 
and its unfortunate effect in restricting the ability of courts 
to remedy many of the evils of modern life. Injunctions 
and similar flexible remedies of equity are much better suited 
than a speculative action for damages to protect interests 
of peesonality when the injuries to them are sufficiently 
serious to \rarraut the interference of the courts. The trend 
of the ckeisions today is toward such protection, even in 
1 he courts of last resort, and an examination of unreported 
eases iu the lower courts collected from newspapers indicates 
that suc:h courts are willing to go farther than the appellate 
judges in frankly protecting interests of personality.'' ( 43 
IIan.hReY. 998.) It is settled in this state that equity will 
protect pnrely pr>rsonal rights, hence the obstacle mentioneu 
in the abon' quotation is removed. (Orloff v. Los Angeles 
Turf Club, 30 Cal.2d 110 [180 P.2d 321, 171 A.L.R 913].) 
There is, therefore, no reason why plaintiff's rights here 
should not be protected. 
As heretofore pointed out there are civil and property 
rights here involved and there are no ecclesiastical disputes 
of any Teind. 'l'here are no questions of whether the correct 
creed or tenets are being followed or what such creeds are. 
It is simply a matter of whether a member of a nonprofit 
eorporation may be removed without cause and hearing. This 
r'mlrt sairl in Rosicnwian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian etc. 
Cluo·cll, 39 CaL2d 121, 131 [245 P.2c1 481]: "The general 
nil1• that courts will llOt interfere in religious societies with 
rcferenee to their ecclesiastical practices stems from the 
sr>paration o£ the church and state, but has always been 
qualified by the rule that civil and property rights would 
be adjnclieatcl1. ... \Yhcther an activity is ecclesiastical or 
involves property rights, especially when a deeision on one 
neee.~sarily involves consideration of the other, are difficult 
q nest ions. Ecclesiastical matters include in the main, creeds 
and proper modes of exercising one's belief. \Vhile the 
principle that courts will not purport to exercise ecclesiastical 
592 ERICKSON v. GOSPEL FOUNDATION OF CALIF. [ 43 0.2d 
is settled as an abstract they will 
determine civil and which depend essentially 
on the contraets of thr as evinced regulations, 
and customs and followed.'' Substantial 
authorities have stated that courts have jurisdiction to review 
the of a member of a organization to 
determine if it ·was in accordance with natural 
North Clinton 75 N.J.L. 167 
257 N.Y. 318 [178 N.E. 545]; Fair-
118 Misc. 639 [195 N.Y.S. 39] ; Gray 
137 Mass. 329 [50 310); 
v. Hellenic Orthodox Soc., 261 Mass. 462 [159 
Rock Dell Norwegian Evan. L. Congregatwn v. 
174 Minn. 207 [219 N.W. 88] .) They stress that 
the by-laws are not to be construed to permit an expulsion 
unless absolutrly neeessary. 'l'he court said in Gray v. Chris-
tian supra, 137 Mass. 329, 331 : "The necessity of 
eomplying with these requirements of common justice [hear-
ing] has been so uniformly asserted, that only a few cases 
need be in addition to those last referred to, to show 
how unwilling courts have been to admit that charters, by-laws, 
or rules could be intended to deprive a man of his membership 
without a hearing.'' This is especially true in the instant 
case where there is no question of religious belief or practices. 
The situation is the same as if a social elub or nonprofit 
corporation is involved. The rules are stated with supporting 
authority: ''One of the bases for court action as to an 
expulsion from a club is the fact that it was in violation 
of the principles of natural justice .... 
''One of the denials of natural justice which will base 
court interference is that of a fair hearing or fair trial. . . . 
"It has been held that a hearing must be afforded by the 
group exercising the expulsory power in all proceedings 
which may result in loss of property, position, or character, 
regardless of whether its committee has previously accorded 
a hearing and of whether the accused demands it, and the 
expulsion of a member without affording him a hearing is 
void .... 
" [I.1] ack of proper notice to the accused member of hearing 
or trial is another violation of the principles of natural 
justice upon the basis of which court action may take 
place .... 
"It is generally held that a member against whom expulsion 
proceedings are brought is entitled to notice of the charge 
against him, . . . 
ERICKSON v. GosPEL FouNDATION OF CALIF. 593 
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or other 
him would be invalid as 
notiee tlwt a member's 
actions to be 
The 
and and tlwre was cause for dismissal 
evidence. 'I'he trial court made no clear-cut "'"""'"'"' 
first and this court should not in effect make one 
as the evidence is capable of different constructions. There 
was no at the meetings at which plaintiff was ex-
pelled that a hearing was being held to consider 
No charges were made nor evidence at those 
The only thing done was the taking of a vote on the 
of expulsion. To justify its position that there was cause 
for plaintiff's expulsion the majority relies on evidence 
i ntrodueed at the trial of the action. 'l'o have a proper 
hearing, there should have been a charge and notice of a 
hearing thPreon and evidence should have been given at the 
hearing and directed to the board members. In other wo:rds 
plaintiff was entitled to know the nature of the charge 
against him and the time and place fixed for a hearing thereon 
t,o that he might be prepared to meet any evidence presented 
in support of such charge. If no such evidence was pre~ 
sented, the charge must necessarily fail. Here there was no 
eharge, notiee, hearing or evidence as a basis for plaintiff's 
expulsion. The fact that evidence was presented at the trial 
of the action brought for the purpose of nullifying the invalid 
expulsion order does not give such order validity. 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a 
24, 1954. Carter, J., was of 
should be 
